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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Soybeans are currently produced and marketed through the commodity system. In such a 
system, soybeans from numerous producers are commingled at the local elevator and sold as 
commodity grain. Profits from production depend on the total output of soybeans. The incentive 
system therefore encourages growers to select high yielding varieties of soybeans. However, the value 
of soybeans to the processor depends on the quantities of soybean meal and oil that can be produced 
from a bushel of soybeans. The outputs of soybean meal and oil depend on the components, protein 
and oil contained in the soybeans. In an efficient market the price of soybeans reflects the value of 
protein and oil contained in the soybeans. Such a system in which the price of a commodity is set in 
accordance with the sum of the value of its components is called component pricing (Perrin, 1980). 
Such a price would give incentives to growers to select varieties with higher ·protein and oil contents 
in them. Although technology to measure protein and oil content using near infrared technology 
(NIR.) is easily available, component pricing based on protein and oil is not commonly used in the 
soybean industry t. One possible reason is that the gains from such a system are not certain . The 
potential inverse relationships between soybean yield and protein (Hanson, 1991) and between 
protein and oil (Leffel, 1998) have an impact on the total value from the soybean crop. Moreover, the 
production of components varies considerably across regions and years (Hurburgh, 1998). This brings 
in additional risk in production that will have to be shared between the processor and the grower. 
This study attempts to address these issues through contract theory. A set of component prices is 
developed in a scenario where high value soybeans are grown under a contract between the processor 
and the grower. A processor would be willing to pay these prices to growers as incentives for growing 
soybeans with increased protein and oil. Since processors would want to maximize profits per bushel 
t One processor Ag Processing Inc. (AGP) constituted a premium based on oil content in 1999. This was extended to include premiums for protein in 2001. 
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of soybeans processed, the incentive system would encourage grnwers to plant varieties that have 
higher components in them. The objective of this study is to design a contract to produce soybeans 
based on protein and oil content. This would include a set of component prices as incentives to grow 
soybeans with higher protein and oil content and a rule to share production risk between the processor 
and the grower. An estimate of the increase in expected social surplus from contracting is made and a 
method to select varieties that processors would want to implement by contracting is proposed. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of the earliest attempts to price soybeans based on its protein and oil content was made 
by Updaw(l976). He used regression equations to calculate the quantities of meal and oil from the 
protein and oil percentages of the soybeans. The average oil yield was subtracted from the sample oil 
yield to give an appropriate discount or premium. The protein percentages of the meal were then 
calculated from the estimated meal quantities by the use of a regression equation and historic USDA 
data. An average value for the soybean meal yield and protein percentage was calculated and 
subtracted from the sample value to obtain a discount or premium. The oil and protein premiums and 
di scounts were then summed for each sample to assign a total premium or discount. This method does 
not take into account the meal and oil prices and therefore does not measure accurately the marginal 
value of soybeans in processing. 
The development of the Estimated Processed Value (EPV) model (Brumm 1990) improved 
accuracy in estimating the quanti6es of meal and oil from soybeans with lrnown protein and oil 
content. The model predicts the yield of crude soybean oil and soybean meal from the processing of 
soybeans m a solvent extraction plant under given soybean composition and processing conditions. 
The yields and prices of the components, meal. oil and hulls were used to calculate the estimated 
processed value of soybeans in dollars. 
EPV = PmWm + P w + PhWh 
2000 ° 0 2000 
(I) 
where EPV is the estimated processed value in dollars per bushel 
Pm is the meal price after discounts from trading rules in dollars per ton 
P 0 is the oil price in dollars per pound 
Ph is the hull price in dollars per ton 
Wm is the weight of soybean meal in pounds per bushel 
and Wh is the weight of hulls in pounds per bushel 
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The weight of hulls can be either positive or negative for removal or addition . The key feature of the 
model is that it includes National Oilseed Processors Association (NOPA) soybean meal trading 
rules. The rules limit the amount of hulls that can be included in the meal, because exceeding the fiber 
limit is so costly that a processor will chose to give away protein in preference to receiving a 10: 1 
fiber discount. Higher soybean protein contents allow the processor to include more hulls in the meal 
while still meeting the protein specifications. This results in greater meal yield. When hulls are added 
to the meal Wh is positive, otherwise Wh is negative. As protein content is increased, a point is 
reached where there is no additional value gained from increased protein content. This is because of 
the fiber limitation on soybean meal. The processor cannot add more hulls, resulting in a greater meal 
yield without exceeding the fiber specification. Additional value comes from increase in oil content 
alone. This method accurately measures the marginal benefit of increasing protein and oil in soybeans 
and with the prices of meal and oil included in the model, provides an improved estimate of the 
marginal value product of soybeans. The EPV also reflects the current market conditions through 
changes in the price of soybean meal and oil. 
At the implementation level, only one processor, AGP Inc., has instituted a pricing scale 
based on protein and oil content. The structure of the premiums for the year 2001 is shown in Table l 
below. Premiums are awarded for oil above 19.5 % and higher and protein percentages 37 % and 
higher. The minimum oil required to receive the protein premium is 19.5%.Protein and oil are 
expressed on an as is moisture basis and components can be increased with drying. This premium 
system was found to be inadequate in providing effective incentives for growers because the protein 
levels required to qualify for a protein premium are so high that they are unlikely to be achieved. 
Also, there is a minimum oil level to get a protein premium. Protein percentages above 3 7% qualified 
for a premium of 3 cents per bushel. Therefore the incentives for protein are not likely to compete 
with that of oil when there is an inverse relationship between the two components. To overcome and 
correct these limitations, a pricing system for soybeans is proposed that would reflect the marginal 
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value of protein and oil in soybeans. It will also include base premium payments to compensate for 
the yield drag and account for variability in the production of components across regions and years. 
Table 1: c omoonent p renuum s h d 1 2001 c e u e 
Percent Oil* Oil Premium Percent protein Protein premium (37% and above) 
19.4 or less None 36.9% and less None 
19.5 to 19.8 2.0 cents 3 7% and higher 3.0 cents 
19.9 to 20.1 3.0 cents 
20.2 to 20.4 4.0 cents 
20.5 to 20.7 5.0 cents 
20.8 to 21 6.0 cents 
21.1 and higher 7.0 cents 
* As is moisture 
Such an incentive system could encourage growers to include protein and oil in their variety selection 
decisions. The key to component pricing is to provide adequate incentives to producers that would 
enable them to take actions to increase components from the soybean crop, assuming that the 
technology to increase components is available. 
Interest in component pricing sterns from the important question of how much value could be 
added to the soybean crop through component pricing and whether this added value is economically 
significant. Prominent among the studies that have estimated the social costs and benefits from 
pricing components in soybeans are those by Perrin (1980) and Updaw (1980). Perrin estimated 
moderate gains while Updaw estimated losses for the society as a whole as a result of the introduction 
of component pricing. Updaw developed an economic model of the production of soybeans and 
market equilibrium in the soybean oil and meal markets. 
He estimated the production possibility frontier of meal and oil with the varieties of soybean 
that were used in production between 1971-75. The elasticity of transformation between protein and 
oil was estimated as infinity and the economically relevant frontier, a single point. He concluded that 
the effective value of the elasticity of transformation is zero. Component pricing would therefore not 
be able to induce the desired effect of increasing the protein and oil content of soybeans with the 
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existing varieties of soybeans grown between 1971-75. He argued that the production of protein and 
oil would not change as a result of component pricing. With costs of pricing components at $0.81 
cents a bushel, component pricing would result in net losses to the society. Assuming that component 
measurement occurs 2.5 times as soybeans progress through domestic marketing channels, for the 
average year during 1971-75 the annual social costs were estimated to be $12,585,375. 
Perrin assumed elasticities of transformation of -0.5 and 1.5 and estimated the net gains at 
most about $125 million which is a modest value of about 1.4 per cent of the value of the annual 
soybean crop. He estimated the consumer's surplus and producer's surplus of the change in price that 
would result because of component pricing. His results show that oil consumers gain $ 628 million 
and protein consumers lose $495 million from the introduction of component pricing. The impact on 
producers was estimated to be negligible. Additional costs of component pricing were not taken into 
account in the study. 
These models took the general equilibrium two good economy approach to modeling the 
soybean market. The change in quantities supplied for a change in price was estimated using the 
production possibilities frontier. The changes in prices and quantities were used to measure the 
consumer's and producer's surplus. These changes would be economy wide and under the 
assumptions of the model, component pricing would have to be implemented on an economy wide 
basis. The results however might be different in a single processor-grower coordination effort where 
the actions of one processor or one grower would not affect equilibrium prices and quantities in the 
market. 
Hurburgh and Huck (1998) used data from the Iowa Soybean yield trials from the year 1997 
to estimate the increase in value due to components in soybeans. The EPV was used as a measure of 
the value of protein and oil contained in the soybeans. A method for selecting varieties with higher 
yields and components was proposed. Among the highest yielding varieties those with the highest 
sum of protein and oil percentages were selected. EPV was regressed over the sum and it was found 
7 
that the sum could predict EPV with a margin of error of ±0.3 units of standard deviation . The 
varieties were then ranked by yield and the top half was selected. Those varieties that were 0.5 and 1 
standard deviation higher than the average sum were selected and their EPVs were predicted. The 
difference in EPVs from the average in the top half of the yields ranged between 12-24 cents a bushel. 
Hurburgh and Huck therefore claimed that an increase in value of 12-24 cents a bushel could be 
achieved without a reduction in yield. 
This method overestimates the benefits from component pricing in soybeans for several 
reasons. 
• The yield of soybeans that is important in determining the total amount of meal and oil 
produced per acre of soybeans. The tradeoffs between yield and oil and protein and oil are 
important in determining the total value from the soybean crop. On closer examination of 
data it was found that there is also a significant variation in the yield and components even in 
the top half of the yields in the sample; therefore it cannot be assumed that the increased 
components can be achieved without a reduction in yield. The measure of surplus from 
component pricing should include the yield per acre because that would determine the total 
meal and oil that can be processed from an acre of soybeans produced. 
• It also does not take into account the costs of processing soybeans. Costs of processing are 
measured per bushel of soybeans and an improvement in the quality of soybeans is akin to 
increasing the processing capacity. 
The costs of measurement and segregation were estimated as 3 cents a bushel in 1991. Since 
then, the cost of the tester has been halved and accuracy improved so the costs were projected at 2 
cents a bushel (Hurburgh 1997). With costs having fallen from $0.81/bu to $0.02/bu since 1971-75 ( 
Updaw 1980) , the benefits of component pricing could exceed the costs of measurement and 
implementation. 
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Grower response to component pricing would be to select varieties that would maximize their 
gross profits . These profits would depend on the specific component pricing regime. Component 
pricing of soybeans complicates the problem of variety selection for producers. This occurs because 
varieties differ not only in their yields but also in their protein and oil content. Another factor that 
producers need to take into consideration is the nature of the physical relationships among the 
components. Significantly high negative correlations have been found between protein and oil 
content and also between the seed yield and protein content. Producers will need to estimate their 
gross return per acre before deciding to plant a particular variety. This value will be influenced not 
only by differences among varieties in the yields, percentages of protein and oil but also the relative 
prices of meal and oil. To aid in the decision making process of producers several measures have 
been developed to rank varieties based on the economic value of their components. 
Significant among the measures developed to rank varieties is the Constituent Yield Index 
(CONY) (Helms and Watt, 1991). The CONY is defined as CONY=(P+O) Y where P,O are the 
percentages of protein and oil and Y is the grain yield. The CONY index is independent of the 
relationship between protein and oil prices and can be used as a simple and approximate measure of 
the value of soybeans. It was found to give the same ranking of soybean varieties as the GV A or gross 
value per acre that is defined as GVA= PY where Pis the price of the soybean when its components 
are priced and Y is the yield of the soybeans. Such indices were developed to aid the variety selection 
decision for producers. 
Leffel(l 998) compared high protein varieties and traditional varieties for their gross returns 
per acre. He utilized the formulae of Updaw and Nichols and determined the total discounts and 
premiums per bushel for each variety in each environment. He found that protein premiums were 
largely eliminated by oil discounts for the highest protein varieties. High protein soybeans were not 
more profitable than conventional varieties when their gross returns per acre were compared. The 
value of soybean varieties was consistent over a wide range of protein and oil prices. The result of the 
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study can be attributed to the lower yield of the high protein lower oil soybean and fwther reiterates 
the importance of the tradeoffs between protein content and oil content and protein content and yield 
in the production of soybeans. 
Leffel(l 990) compared alternative economic models used by Updaw and Nichols, the EPV 
model and the Approximate Process Value (APV) model (Hanson, 1989). The APV is defined in 
terms of soybean components and their values as 
(2) 
where P0 is the oil price in $/lb, P44 is the 44% protein meal price in $/lb, Y and X are the protein and 
oil percentages at 13 percent moisture. Leffel used these models in making recommendations for 
soybean variety selection. Leffel showed that all three methods provided approximately the same 
valuation and recommended that soybean producers produce the highest yielding, high-oil soybeans 
assuming that the price of oil to the price of meal bears a 2: 1 ratio. 
Several methods have been proposed to aid variety selection for growers, and each of these 
methods would depend on the component prices that are being used in the market. In this study, a 
method of selecting varieties is developed. Scarce data on variety and environmental effects prevent a 
more sophisticated econometric analysis. Data on yields of selected soybean varieties grown in 
different environments over several years will help to find the variety that will maximize surplus and 
reduce risk when soybeans are priced based on their components. The objectives of the study are: 
• Develop a set of component prices or a grid that provides incentives for variety selection in 
soybeans that would maximize surplus per acre of soybeans produced. 
• Estimate the potential surplus from variety selection and compare this surplus across several 
regions in Iowa and Illinois to see where the maximum benefits from component pricing will 
be captured. 
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• Find a decision rule that would help growers select the varieties that would maximize surplus 
for the growers and the processors. 
The incentive payments for protein and oil are developed in a contract theory framework. The 
motivation to move from the traditional commodity market system to that of a contract based system 
comes from coordination benefits and risk sharing (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). In a typical 
principal agent setting the actions of the agent are not observable to the principal. The contract is then 
designed in such a way to ensure that the agents would take actions that are desired by the principal. 
Such models are called hidden action or moral hazard models. In such models, the actions that are 
contracted upon affect the profits of the principal. The profits of the principal are assumed to be 
stochastic. Though the actions of the agent are not observable, they can be inferred through a vector 
of signals. In the contract design problem of interest here the principal is assumed to be the processor, 
the grower is the agent who caries out actions on his behalf. The stochastic nature of production of 
components and the associated risk in production, hidden actions of the agents, the fact that the 
incentive payments can be conditi.oned on the quality measures that are observable by both parties 
and measurable by NIR; all these features make the framework very convenient to develop a set of 
incentive payments conditioned on observed and measurable yields, protein and oil outcomes in 
soybean production. This is how the risk incentive framework of the Principal Agent theory 
(Grossman and Hart, 1983) is used to design an optimal contract that can be used by the processors to 
provide incentives to growers to select varieties that can maximize EPV per bushel. It is assumed that 
growers will be able to take actions that can influence the quality of output. Under the commodity 
system, growers maximize yield per acre but under the contract they would maximize EPV per 
bushel. A variety selection rule that would maximize EPV per bushel from the soybean crop is 
developed. This surplus is estimated across different regions to find where the maximum benefits 
from component pricing can be captured. 
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CHAPTER 3. DATA 
All the data used in the study are the outcome of trials conducted and reported in the Varietal 
Information Program for Soybeans. The tests are conducted on as uniform a soil as is available in the 
testing area. Small plots are used to reduce the chance of soil and climatic variations occurring 
between one variety plot and another. Performance results for yield and 31 other important attributes 
including protein (% per dry weight), oil (% by dry weight), isoflavones, fatty acids and amino acids 
are conducted. The protein and oil content of the entries are determined with an Infratec near-infrared 
transmittance analyzer. 
Test Program in Iowa: 
Iowa Crop Performance tests for soybeans are conducted each year to provide information 
growers need to select the best varieties for their production conditions. Seed companies, Iowa 
growers and the Iowa Crop Improvement Association include entries in the Iowa Crop Performance 
Test. Entries in the test are evaluated at three regions in each district. The northern district includes 
the northern three tiers of counties, the central district includes the central three tiers and the southern 
district includes the southern three tiers of counties in Iowa. The individual locations and the counties 
are shown in the table below: 
1. Northern District: Sioux Rapids (Buena Vista county), Luveme(Humboldt county), and 
Greene(Butler county) 
2. Central District Arcadia( Carroll county), Boxholm (Boone county), and Keystone( Benton 
county) 
3. Southern District: Griswold(Cass county), Winterset(Madison county), 
Crawfordsville(Washington county) 
Entries are grown in four-row plots with a row spacing of 27 inches. Three replications of the 
entries are used at each location. A preplant herbicide is applied at all locations. Two post emergence 
herbicide tests are offered for each district. Both conventional and Roundup varieties are grown. The 
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trials are conducted identically each year and data from Iowa for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 are 
used in this study. Data from all the locations were not available for all the years. Griswold was lost 
to a severe winter storm in 2000. In all, 8580 observations were used in the study. Since data were 
available for individual locations it was possible to look at the variation of components within and 
across regions and make an estimate of the effect component pricing would have on farm revenues 
across regions. The only information on the variety was the commercial names and had no 
information on the genotype. This made the data on variety confusing and unmanageable. On this 
account, most of the analysis ignores varietal effect. The crucial limitation of the data were the lack of 
adequate information to group similar varieties together. Without this information it is very difficult 
to find a rule to select varieties that maximize surplus and thereby measure accurately the gains from 
component pricing. It was also found that the life cycle of varieties is 2-3 years making it difficult to 
look at the performance of a single variety across several years to assess its performance. 
T bl 2 N b f b a e um ero o servat1ons b 1v region and vear 
Region 1998 1999 2000 
Northern District 1089 11 76 1118 
Central District 1065 11 75 1130 
Southern District 681 768 478 
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CHAPTER 4. DAT A ANALYSIS 
Summary Statistics: 
In this section the data described earlier are used to compare yields and components across 
regions in Iowa and estimate the increase in expected social surplus from improved variety selection. 
The data are divided into Northern, Central and Southern regions using the convention adopted in the 
Iowa Soybean Yield Trials. 
The mean and coefficient of variation for yield in bu/acre, protein and oil in percentages are 
reported in table 3 below. There is considerable variability in the characteristics within regions as 
shown by the coefficient of variation. The average yield of soybeans ranged from 50.10 bu/acre to 
63.16 bu/acre, protein content from 35.24 % to 37.12%, and oil content from 17.79 % to 19.79% 
between regions. 
T bl 3 S a e ummary s fi Y Id Pr tat:Istics or 1e , d 0-1 otem an l 
Yield Protein Oil 
(bu/acre) (percent) (percent) 
Region 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 
Northern 57.85 53.52 57.72 36.48 35.45 36.08 19.10 18.49 18.89 
(15 .89) (7.19) (6 .91) (2.97) (3 .99) (3.16) (3.05) (3 .82) (3.33) 
Central 63.16 54.56 50.10 35.57 35.24 36.68 19.79 18.19 18.42 
(8.81) (7.83) (8.32) (3.49) (2.94) (3.27) (3 .99) (4.22) (4.23) 
Southern 55.98 53.67 50.53 35.99 36.55 37.12 19.37 17.79 18.65 
(8.54) (9.51) (8.39) (3 .38) (2.89) (2.79) (4.1 5) (4.42) (3 .20) 
Mean 
(Coefficient of Variation in percentages) 
Estimation of the increase in expected social surplus from contracting: 
It is assumed that under the commodity pricing system growers select varieties with relatively 
high yield per acre. Under a contract, processors provide incentives for growers to select varieties that 
have relatively high EPV per bushel. Let the action that growers take be variety selection. Let aL be 
the action of selecting varieties that are the highest yielding and let aH be the action that growers take 
to select varieties with the highest EPV per bushel. Let the EPV generated by taking action aL be 
denoted by V(r,ql aL) where r =protein, q=oil. Similarly V(r,ql aH) represents the EPV generated 
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when action aH is taken by the grower. The processor wants to implement action aH by contracting. 
The difference between the expected values of the EPV from taking action aH over taking action aL is 
an estimate of the increase in expected social surplus from contracting. Table 4 and 5 show the 
summary statistics of the data under the two proposed actions. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Yield, Protein and Oil under action aL (Top quartile in 
yield/acre) 
Yield Protein Oil 
(bu/acre) (percent) (percent) 
Region 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 
Northern 68.01 58.32 62.55 36.76 35.15 62.55 18.84 18.57 18.78 
(3.20) (2.41) (2.95) (2.17) (2.99) (2.95) (2.25) (3.09) (3.52) 
Central 70.28 60.00 55.00 35.68 34.95 55.00 19.49 18.37 18.66 
(3 .98) (2.88) (3.12) (2.43) (2.54) (3.12) (3.02) (3 .73) (4.27) 
Southern 61.66 60.14 55.87 35.82 36.70 55.87 19.55 18.31 18.64 
(2.54) (3.42) (3.38) (3.78) (2.86) (3.38) (4.09) (3.38) (3.37) 
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Yield, Protein and Oil under action aH (Top quartile in 
EPV/bushel) 
Yield Protein Oil 
(bu/acre) (percent) (percent) 
Region 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 
Northern 58.93 51.78 55.35 37.49 37.18 37.31 18.95 18.01 18.82 
(15.13) (7.43) (7.55) (2.33) (2.19) (2.05) (3.52) (3.53) (2.93) 
Central 60.00 53.44 48.69 36.82 36.11 37.77 19.50 18.38 18.29 
(8.46) (8.45) (10 .03) ( 1.99) (2.22) (2.39) (3.26) (2.92) (3.54) 
Southern 57.1 1 56.98 49.79 37. 16 37.44 38.05 19.28 18.31 18.66 
(7.62) (8.88) (8.47) (2.21) (2.26) (2.19) (3.65) (3 .10) (3.48) 
S = E((V(r,q I aH ))-E(V(r,q I a r )) (3) 
The estimation of the social surplus from contracting is outlined below: 
1. Regression Analysis: Two samples from the entire data set of protein and oil outcomes 
are selected corresponding to varieties selected under action aL and under action aH. To 
represent the sample selected under action aL, varieties in the top quartile of the yields in 
each region and year are selected. The varieties in the top quartile in EPV per bushel for 
each year and region are selected to represent the sample that growers would select under 
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action aH. Two regressions one with protein and the other with oil as the dependent 
variable are run on indicator variables representing region year and the type of soybean 
(Conventional/Rot.mdup) conditional on the action taken by the grower. 
2. Joint density estimation: Residuals from these regressions are used to estimate the joint 
distribution of (q , r) conditional on each action. The indicator variables are added back 
to get the distributions corresponding to each region, year and soybean type. The 
marginal densities show the improvement in the distribution of protein and oil 
percentages that can be brought about through a contract. 
3. Calculation of the EPV: The EPV was calculated using SPROC V 2.42 (Brumm and 
Hurburgh, 1990) for the protein oil combinations corresponding to each region and year 
combination. Each protein and oil combination gives a unique value of the EPV. 
4. Estimation of the social surplus from contracting: The estimated j oint distribution of 
protein and oil is used to calculate the expected value of EPV from a bushel of soybeans 
conditional on each action. The difference between the expected value of EPV 
conditional on action aH over that conditioned on action aL gives an estimate of the 
expected increase in social surplus from contracting a bushel of soybeans. This is 
multiplied by the yield per acre to get the expected social surplus per acre of soybeans 
grown. 
Regression analysis: 
Under action aL, growers select the top yielding varieties of soybeans. The sample 
corresponding to action aL is the set of varieties that are in the top quartile in yield for each year and 
region. Growers taking action aH select varieties that have high EPV per bushel. The sample 
corresponding to the action aH is the top quartile of observations for each region and year in their 
EPV per bushel . Since there is considerable variabil ity in yield and components across regions and 
years, it becomes necessary to estimate the distribution of protein and oil across the three regions and 
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years under the assumed actions taken by the growers. Geographic differences in composition are 
primarily caused by environmental factors (Hurburgh, 2000). The most important factor in explaining 
differences in composition in soybeans has been temperature. Soybeans from northern and western 
soybean growing states (North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa , Wisconsin) contained about 
1.5 - 2% less protein and 0.2 --0.5% more oil than soybeans from Southern States (Texas, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina) 
(Hurburgh et.al. 1990) . 
Two linear regressions one with protein and the other with oil as the dependent variable are 
run on each of these samples with year, region and type as indicator variables. Two indicator 
variables are used to identify the three regions. Similarly two indicators are used to identify the three 
years. The regression equation was used to analyze the data for the significance of the region and year 
variables. The regression equation took the form 
(4) 
where Yij la; is the dependent variable, the percentage of protein or oil in the soybean sample 
conditional on the given action. 
Xii is the indicator variable for region that take the values 
X1; = l if Central district otherwise X ii =O 
X2; = 1 if Southern district otherwise X2; =O 
X3; and Xi; are the two indicator variables used to identify the years 1999 and 2000. 
X3; = I if year= 1999 and X3; =O otherwise 
X;; =O if year=2000 and X;; =O otherwise 
Xs; is an indicator or a dummy variable for the type of soybeans, Conventional or Roundup and takes 
the following values, X5; =1 if Conventional otherwise X5; =O 
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The term E;J is the random error and captures the effect on protein and oil that 1s unexplained 
by the indicators. No assumptions are made on the distribution of errors. If all the indicator values are 
set to zero the value of protein and oil correspond to the year 1998, Conventional and located in the 
Northern district. The relevant indicator values can be set to one to get the mean values for each 
region, year and type combination. The residuals from the regression are then used to estimate the 
bivariate distribution of protein and oil. By using the residuals from the regression to estimate the 
bivariate distribution of protein and oil it is being assumed that the distributions differ only in their 
mean across regions and years. The significant coefficients are added back to get the distribution 
corresponding to each location and year. The regression of protein and oil using the sample 
conditional on action aL is reported in Table 6 and 7. The coefficient for the central district CP 2) was 
not found to be significant over the base region (Northern district) . The coefficient for the Southern 
district was significantly different from zero. The indicator variables for the year 1999 and 2000 were 
significant. The indicator p s was significant indicating that there is significant difference between the 
Conventional and Roundup varieties. In the regression of oil on the indicator variables the region 
variable P 1 was not significant but the variables P 2 , P 3 and p 4 are significant at the 5% level. All 
the year indicators and the Conventional/Roundup indicators are significant. It can be concluded that 
there is significant difference between years and across the Conventional and Roundup varieties. The 
Southern district was significant in its effect on protein and oil values. A similar regression was run 
when action aH is taken by the grower. The sample of observations used for this regression is the set 
of varieties with the highest EPV per bushel in each of the regions and years. 
The results from the regression of protein and oil on the indicator variables showed that the 
location variables are not significant but the years are significant. The Conventional/Round up 
indicator turned out to be significant. All the indicators turned out to be significant in the regression 
of oil on the indicators. It can be concluded that among the varieties with the highest EPV, region 
indicators are not significant in explaining variations in protein, but they explained variation in oil 
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values. The indicators for the years are significant in protein and oil suggesting that year to year 
variation in protein and oil values is significant. The results of the regression of protein and oil under 
action aH are reported in Table 8 and 9. 
Table 6: Regression of protein on region, type and year under action aL 
Variable Degrees of Parameter Standard T value Pr> I ti 
freedom Estimate Error 
Intercept I 35.8474 0.0455 786.57 <0.0001 * 
Central I -0.0837 0.0754 -1.11 0.2670 
region 
Southern 1 0.5643 0.0914 6.17 <0.0001 * 
region 
1999 I -0.3795 0.0611 -6.21 <0.000 I* 
2000 1 0.5272 0.0633 8.32 <0.0001 * 
Type 1 0.1338 0.0672 1.99 0.0467* 
,i _ 0 R -10.85, * Significant at the 5 Yo level for a two-tailed test 
Bivariate density estimation of protein and oil: 
The residuals from the distribution of protein and oil conditional on the actions aL and aH are 
used to estimate the bivariate density function of protein and oil conditional on the given action. Non-
parametric kernel density methods are used to estimate these distributions. Non- parametric kernel 
density methods help to describe data when parametric distributions do not effectively summarize a 
data distribution. This typically happens when data are skewed or are multimodal. Non-parametric 
kernel density estimation is used to smooth a density estimate that accounts for such characteristics. 
Kernel density estimation is a technique that averages a kernel function across observations to create 
a smooth approximation. The density function f(r,q J a;) i = L, H was estimated using the non-
parametric kernel density estimator (Silverman, 1996). The kernel density estimate is defined by the 
equation: 
f(r,q I a,.)= - 1-tK(r-R,, q-Q;J 
nh,hq i•I h, hq 
(5) 
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Table 7: Regression of oil on region, type an d d year un er action aL 
Variable Degrees of Parameter Standard Tvalue Pr>Jti 
freedom Estimate Error 
Intercept 1 19.3746 0.0279 694.09 <0.0001 * 
Central 1 -0 .0502 0.0462 -1.09 0.2670 
region 
Southern 1 0.2619 0.0560 4.68 <0.0001 * 
region 
1999 1 - 1.0456 0.0374 -27.92 <0.000 1 * 
2000 1 -0.7044 0.0388 -18.15 <0.0001 * 
Type 1 -0.0637 0.0411 -1.55 0.0467* 
i _ * 0 R -28.04, · S1gr11ficant at the 5 Yo level for a two-tailed test 
Table 8: Regression of protein on region, type and year under action aH 
Variable Degrees of Parameter Standard T value Pr>Jti 
freedom Estimate Error 
Intercept 1 35.5077 0.03218 1103.53 <0.0001 * 
Central 1 -0.0269 0.04839 -0.56 0.5781 
region 
Southern 1 0.0928 0.05944 1.56 <0.1182 
region 
1999 1 0.4959 0.04033 12.30 <0.0001 * 
2000 1 0.6634 0.04107 16.14 <0.000 1 * 
Type 1 0.1006 0.03339 3.01 0.0026* 
l_ R - 12.09, * S1gmficant at the 5% level for a two-tailed test 
T 1 ab e 9: Regression of oil on region, type and year under action aH 
Variable Degrees of Parameter Standard T value Pr>Jtl 
freedom Estimate Error 
Intercept 1 19.9200 0.0215 926.72 <0.0001 * 
Central 1 -0.0787 0.0323 -2.44 0.0149* 
region 
Southern 1 0.4577 0.0397 11.53 <0.000 1 * 
region 
1999 1 -1.4796 0.0269 -54.92 <0.0001 * 
2000 1 -0.8003 0.0274 -29.17 <0.0001 * 
Type 1 0.0457 0.0223 2.05 0.0404* 
l R -57.69, *S1griificant at the 5% level for a two-tailed test 
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where n is the sample size, K is the standard normal density function and hx and hy are constants 
depending on the size of the sample that controls the amount of smoothing in the estimate. hx >O and 
hy >Oare called bandwidth parameters and they have substantial effect on the value of the density 
estimate. The function K(r,q) is the bivariate normal density function 
1 r 2 + 2 
K(r,q) =-exp(- q ) 
21! 2 (6) 
The estimated joint distributions under action aL and under action aH for the Northern district in l 998 
are shown in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. The marginal density functions for rand q are estimated 
using the joint density function of (r,q). The marginal density function for r is defined as, 
f(r I a;) = J f(r ,q I a)dq 
(7) 
Similarly, the marginal density function for q is defined as, 
f(q I a;)= f f(r ,q I a; )dr 
(8) 
The estimated marginal distribution of protein and oil under the two actions for the Northern district 
in 1998 is displayed in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. The vertical axes represent the probability 
density of protein and oil. The significant coefficients from the regression are added back to the 
estimated distribution to get the distribution for the relevant region and year combination. It is 
assumed that the distributions for each region and year differ in their mean values alone. It can be 
seen that quality incentives cause a shift in the marginal density of protein and oil. This shift 
represents the improvement in quality from contracting. It was found that the mean value for oil 
increased but the mean protein fell from contracting. But the variation in both protein and oil values 
reduced considerably from contracting. 
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f Table 10: Characteristics of the bivariate distn utJ.on o protein an 01 un er d ·1 d th ti e two ac ons 
Mean (aL) Variance ( aL) Mean (aH) Variance( aH) 
Protein 35.84 1.39 35.50 0.63 
Oil 19.37 0.52 19.92 0.28 
Calculation of the EPV: 
• The EPV was used as a measure of the value that can be generated from processing a bushel 
of soybeans. The Estimated Processed Value was calculated through the program SPROC V 
2.42. The prices used are $166.26/ton for soybean meal, $0 .18/lb for soybean oil and 
$0.0 l/ton for hulls. These prices were the averages for the years 1998-2000 at Decatur, 
Illinois. All the NOPA (National Oilseeds Processing Association) rules were applied. The 
limitations of fiber content of 3 .5 % for 48% meal was used. The discount for exceeding the 
maximum fiber specifications being 1% of the invoice price per 0.1 % fiber in excess of 
specification was used. A tolerance of 0.3 percentage points in fiber is allowed. 
• The protein discount of 2 times the unit price of protein per 1 % protein below minimum 
specifications was used. 
• The EPV was calculated on a 13 % moisture basis and no premiums were awarded for 
producing meal with protein content in excess of the specifications. 
Figures 5 and 6 summarize the relationship between EPV and oil at fixed levels of protein. 
Protein levels at 30,35,40 and 45 % were arbitrarily selected and the relationship with increased oil 
was examined. As oil is increased, EPV increases linearly when premiums are awarded for meal 
above 48%. When protein is not awarded with a premium for exceeding specifications above 48% 
meal , protein levels of 40 and 45% give the same line. This means that there cannot be an increase in 
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Bivariate density of protein and oil when yield is maximized 
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Figure 1: Bivariate density function of protein and oil under action aL 
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Bivariate density of protein and oil when EPV is maximized 
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Figure 2: Bivariate density function of protein and oil under action aH 
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Figure 3: Estimated marginal distribution of protein 
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Figure 4: Estimated marginal distribution of oil 
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EPV for protein increases from 40 to 45%. This relationship can be understood more clearly from the 
EPV protein plots. To examine the relationship of EPV with protein, plots were made between EPV 
and protein with levels of oil arbitrarily fixed at 14 %, 18% and 22%. These are shown in Figures 7 
and 8. The EPV increased linearly and then became constant at higher levels of protein when EPV 
was not awarded with a premium. Increase in protein above a certain point does not increase the EPV, 
although these levels of protein can be physically achieved in the soybeans. This is because adding 
hulls to increase meal yield will exceed the fiber requirement. The processor cannot add more hulls, 
resulting in a greater meal yield without exceeding the fiber specification. Additional value comes 
from increase in oil content alone. When protein is rewarded with a premium for exceeding 
specifications of meal above 48%, the rate of increase of EPV falls after the target meal specification 
of 48% is reached. The incremental benefit from increased oil is linear, but it is not so for protein. 
0 
::? ... Cl ... .. ~ ... Cl ..; ::? :: ~ .,; .... 
Oil 
j--Prolt!ln30% --Proceln 35% 
Figure 5: EPV Vs Oil at fixed levels of protein 
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Figure 8: EPV Vs Protein at fixed levels of oil when protein is rewarded with a premium. 
48% meal specifications 
Estimation of the expected social surplus from contracting: 
The estimation of the expected social surplus from contracting was done under the 
assumption that currently growers select varieties that have high yield per acre. Under a contract, 
growers select varieties that have high EPV per bushel. The surplus that can be obtained from 
contracting a bushel of soybeans is calculated as 
S = f V(r,q)f(r, q I aH)drdq - f V(r,q)f(r,q I al)drdq 
(9) 
where V(r ,q) is the EPV from processing a bushel of soybeans where r=percentage of protein in the 
soybeans , q=percentage of oil in the soybeans and f(r,qJa;) is the estimated distribution of protein and 
oil conditional on the action ai . 
The estimated distributions are used to calculate the expected values of the EPV conditional 
on action al and action aH for Conventional varieties of soybeans for each region and year. It is 
assumed that the outcomes of protein and oil follow a discrete distribution. The EPV for each of these 
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combinations of protein and oil are found. The estimated bivariate distribution of protein and oil is 
used to find the density at each of these points. These densities are multiplied by the EPV to get the 
expected value of the EPV for each region and year. These values are substituted into (9) to estimate 
the increase in expected social surplus from contracting. 
. I Table 11: Expected increase m soc1a suro us estimate db >Y year an d . $/b region m u 
Region 1998 1999 2000 
I 0.12 0.12 0.08 
2 0.18 0.20 0 .08 
3 0.18 0.20 0.15 
Average 0.16 0.18 0.10 
. Average across all 0.15 
regions 
The increase in surplus obtained from growing an acre of soybeans can be defined as 
(10) 
where S is the social surplus that be generated from contracting a bushel of soybeans and y is the 
yield per acre. 
Assuming that there is no yield drag in the production of soybeans with higher components 
then y is the expected yield when action aL is taken. The calculated value of y is the average yield in 
the top quartile of yields selected by region and year. The expected surplus estimated per acre is 
shown in table 12. When it is assumed that there is no yield drag in the production of soybeans with 
higher components, the surplus from contracting soybeans averaged to $8.96 an acre. However, it is 
expected that there will be a fall in yield when soybeans with higher components are selected because 
of the inverse relationship between soybean yield and protein. The yield drag for each region and year 
combination was calculated as the percentage change in yield when action aL is implemented vis-a-vis 
action aH. The fall in yield averaged to -0.10 % when varieties are selected by the EPV per bushel 
rather than by yield. If y is the expected yield when action aH is taken, the value of y is calculated as 
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I Table 12: Surplus estimated bv year and region in$ acre wt . Id dr ag no yie 
Region 1998 1999 2000 
1 8.16 6.99 5.00 
2 12.65 12.00 4.40 
3 11.09 12.02 8.38 
Average 10.64 10.34 7.14 
Average across all 8.96 
years 
Table l 3 . Id d : Yte rag m percentages 
Region 1998 1999 2000 
l -13 -11 -11 
2 -14 -10 -11 
3 -7 -5 -10 
Average -11 -8 -10 
Average across all -10 
years 
Table 14: s iw-plus estimate db 1v year an d . $/ . h . Id dr reglon m acre wit a vie ag 
Region 1998 1999 2000 
1 7.07 6.21 4.42 
2 10.80 10.68 3.89 
3 10.27 11.39 7.46 
Average 9.38 9.43 6.57 
Average across all 8.02 
years 
the average yield of the soybeans in the top quartile ofEPY per bushel of soybeans selected. The 
social surplus that is generated per acre from contracting is then estimated in the table 14. The 
expected gains from contracting are estimated as $0.15 a bushel and $8.02 an acre of soybeans 
planted. This means that there are considerable gains from contracting and this value can be 
transferred from the processors to growers. A contract between processors and growers is designed 
that provides incentives for growers to include protein and oil in their variety selection decisions. The 
contract is designed based on the assumption that growers are risk-neutral. Therefore, the grower 
faces all the risk in the production of components. 
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CHAPTER 5. MODEL 
A principal agent model is used to develop a contract between a single processor and grower. 
The contract determines the compensation for a single bushel of soybeans based on its protein and oil 
content. The outline of a basic contract design problem is as follows. If actions of the grower are 
observable to the processor, the contract would specify the actions to be taken by the grower and the 
compensation that the processor would provide in return. But actions taken by the grower are not 
observable to the processor (hidden actions), therefore the contract must be designed in such a way 
that indirectly gives the grower incentives to take the same actions that would be contracted for if his 
actions are observable. In this problem the grower's compensation scheme is designed to give him 
incentives to include protein and oil in his variety selection decisions. Since the actions of the grower 
are not observable to the processor, he will condition the grower's compensation based on some 
vector of observable signals through which the processor can infer actions taken by the grower. In the 
current problem, these observable signals are the protein and oil percentages in soybeans. Protein and 
oil content are measurable and observable to both the processor and the grower. Let 
S = { (r , q ), r E R, q E Q} be the set of all possible realizations of s. Since s is fully observable by 
both parties, grower compensation can be specified for each level of s(r,q). Suppose that the processor 
offers a compensation schedule of the form w(r,q) = V(r,q)- a 
where a is some constant. This contract would give the grower compensation that equals V(r,q) 
except for a fixed payment a . 
The processor is assumed to be risk neutral and his profits depend on the quality of inputs, 
and can be described by the function V(r,q), for simplicity can be written as V(s), an increasing and 
concave function . It is assumed that there is no price risk for both the processor and grower. Let a 
denote the action choice of the grower where a = {a L, a H } where aL denotes the action of selecting 
varieties that maximize yield per acre and a8 being the action of selecting varieties that maximize 
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EPV per bushel. Taking action aH will involve certain costs for the grower over action aL. These costs 
can be interpreted as the costs of searching and variety selection. Through the commodity market 
system growers take action aL and it is assumed that the processor wishes to implement aH through 
the contract. Action a8 leads to higher profits for the processor but entails greater difficulty for the 
grower. The processor's profits are affected by the actions of the grower but are not fully determined 
by it because of natural risk in the production of components. The processor's profits are assumed to 
be stochastic and are conditional on the actions of the growers as described by the following 
conditional probability density function f(sl aL) and f(sJ aH) with f(s J a ) > 0 for all a E [aL, aH] 
and f ( s J a) > 0 for all s E S . 
The assumption made here is that both the processor and the grower are risk-neutral. The 
utility function of the grower can be described as u(w)=w-c(a) where w is the compensation paid to 
the grower and c(a) is the cost of action. Since the grower is neutral he does not need to be insured 
against risk. The optimal contract for the processor solves the following problem 
Max J (V(s)-w(s))f(s I a)ds 
ae laL.aH l,w(s) 
(11) 
subject to 
J w(s)f(s I a')<ls- g(a) ~ ~ (12) 
Equation (11) states that the processor maximizes his profits less wage payments subject to the 
constraint that the expected utility of the grower should be greater than his reservation utility. 
Reservation utility is the utility that the grower gets through the current pricing system, in this case 
being the price of soybeans in the commodity market system. 
This problem is equivalent to minimizing the compensation costs of the processor 
Min Jw(s)f(s I a)ds 
w(s) 
(13) 
subject to 
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Jw(s )f(s I a)ds - g(a) ~ ~ (14) 
The processor optimally specifies the action level a= {a l ,aH} that maximizes his expected profits 
after compensating the grower. 
Max fv(s)f(sj a)ds - ~-g(a) 
aetat ·"H f 
(15) 
a* is the optimal action that solves for ( 15) . Equation (15) specifies the processor ' s profit and the 
-
grower receives an expected utility of at least u . Using the specific form of the grower compensation 
w(s) = V(s)-a 
The grower is willing to accept this contract as long as it gives him an expected utility of at least u , 
as long as 
JV(s)f(s I a)ds -a - g(aH) ~ ~ (16) 
Let a· be the level of a at which the above equation holds with equality. The processor's return 
from the compensation w(V)=V-a · is exactly a· and we find that 
a· = JV(s )f(s I a )ds- g(a)- ~ (17) 
and the optimal compensation scheme is w(s)=V(s)-a ·,which can be written as w(r,q)=V(r,q)- a •. 
The processor finds the action level that maximizes his expected profits after compensating the 
grower. i.e. Max JV(s)f(s I a)ds - ~ -g(a) and the problem is solved in two stages. 
ae~al ·"H} 
Empirical Estimation of the Contract: 
In the following section, the contract designed in the earlier section is estimated empirically 
in the case of soybean production. V(r,q) is the EPV of a bushel of soybeans for a given protein and 
oil content less processing costs. The costs of processing are set at 30 cents a bushel. To compute the 
compensation w( r, q) = V ( r, q) - a * , it is necessary to solve the equation ( 17) for a · . 
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The expected value of EPV per bushel of soybeans is computed for each location and year using the 
empirical bivariate distributions of protein and oil. If the action a H is optimal , then the expected 
return to the processor should be higher under this action. This means that 
f V(r q)f(r,q I aH )drdq - g(aH) ~ f V(r, q)f(r,q I a L)drdq - g(aL) 
(18) 
Normalizing g(aL) = 0 and asswning that the above equation holds with equality we have that 
g (aH ) = j v(r, q )f(r, q I aH )drdq - f V (r ,q)f(r,q I a L)drdq 
(19) 
The expected value of V(r, q) under action a H was found to be $5.68/bu and the expected value of 
EPV per bushel is $5 .56 /bu under action a L for the Northern district in year 1998. This gave an 
estimate of g(aH) as 0.12 cents a bushel. g(aH) is interpreted as the cost of implementing a H over a L . 
-
u = wu is the reservation utility level or the wage payment from trading soybeans in the commodity 
market. This was assumed to be $5.07 /bu , the average price of soybeans over the period 1998-2000 
at Decatur, Illinois. Having identified values for the expression in (9), a · was estimated as $0.49 /bu. 
The payment grid for each level ofr and q was developed as w(r, q) = V(r, q)- a* , by substituting 
the values for V( q,r) and a · . Similarly, a grid of component prices can be developed for each region 
and year. The calculated values of a· for each region and year are shown in Table 16. Under such a 
payment scheme, it was found that the returns per acre for the grower are less than they would get 
under the commodity market system, because the increased payment per bushel does not compensate 
for the fall in yield due to production of soybeans with higher components. Therefore, it becomes 
necessary to compensate growers for the yield drag. This is done through a base payment b that 
satisfies the condition that the expected total returns to the grower from contracting an acre of 
soybeans should equal the expected total returns to the grower from producing an acre of soybeans 
and selling it in the commodity market. 
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b Table 15: Soy ean pnces b d ase on protem an 01 con en m d ·1 t t $/b u 
Oil 18 18.5 19 19.5 20 20.5 21 21.5 22 
Protein 
30 4.00 4.08 4.17 4.24 4.33 4.42 4.49 4.57 4.66 
31 4.20 4.29 4.36 4.45 4.54 4.62 4.71 4.79 4.87 
32 4.42 4.49 4.58 4.66 4.75 4.83 4.91 4.99 5.11 
33 4.62 4.70 4.79 4.87 5.01 5.04 5.10 5.16 5.22 
34 4.82 4.93 4.98 5.04 5.10 5.16 5.22 5.27 5.30 
35 4.99 5.04 5.10 5.16 5.20 5.23 5.25 5.27 5.30 
36 and 5.11 5.13 5.16 5.18 5.20 5.23 5.25 5 .27 5.30 
above 
Table 16: Values of a· for each location and year 
Region 1998 1999 2000 
1 0.49 0.49 0.56 
2 0.34 0.32 0.42 
3 0.47 0.45 0.53 
Average 0.43 0.42 0.50 
Average across all 0.45 
years 
Table 17: Values of b for each location and year 
Re_gion 1998 1999 2000 
1 0.18 0.04 0.02 
2 0.35 0.11 0.16 
3 -0.25 -0.37 -0.06 
Average 0.09 -0.08 0.04 
Average across all 0.02 
vears 
(E(w(r,q))+b)*E( ylaH ) =Wu *E(ylaL) (20) 
The value E(w(r,q)) is found through the payment scheme developed in table 13, and the sample 
means are used as estimators for expected values of the yield per acre conditional on the actions aL 
and aH . The base payments developed per bushel for each location and year are shown in table 17. 
The payments to the grower taking into account the values of b are shown in table 18 for the Northern 
district in 1998. 
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Table 18: Pavments to the grower compensating or e yie agm fi th . Id dr . $/b u 
Oil 18 18.5 19 19.5 20 20.5 21 21.5 22 
Protein 
30 4.18 4.26 4.35 4.42 4.5 1 4.60 4.67 4.75 4.84 
31 4.38 4.47 4.54 4.63 4.72 4.80 4.89 4.97 5.05 
32 4.60 4.67 4.76 4.84 4.93 5.01 5.09 5.17 5.29 
33 4.80 4.88 4.97 5.05 5.19 5.22 5.28 5.34 5.40 
34 5.00 5.11 5.16 5.22 5.28 5.34 5.40 5.45 5.48 
35 5.17 5.22 5.28 5.34 5.38 5.41 5.43 5.45 5.48 
36 and 5.29 5.31 5.34 5.36 5.38 5.41 5.43 5.45 5.48 
above 
Comparison between the AGP grid and the value based grid: 
A market price was of $5.07/bu was used which was the average price of soybeans for the 
years 1998-2001 in Decatur, I1linois. All premiums are awarded over the market price. A premium of 
$0.03/bu was awarded for protein above 37%. A minimum of 19.5 % oil was needed to get the 
protein premium. For protein levels below 37% and oil levels below 19 .4 % there are no premiums. 
There was no premium when protein crossed the 37% level but the oil was below 19.5%. Above the 
19 .5 % level oil, premium are granted irrespective of the protein levels, but to qualify for the protein 
premium, the level of oil had to be above 19 .5%. 
Comparison in returns per bushel between the AGP component prices and the value based 
grid at selected protein and oil values shown in Table 19 below. Since the value based grid has a 
return calculated for each realization of the signal s, which are a protein oil combination in our 
example, while the AGP grid does not, they are compared only at certain combinations of protein and 
oil. To compare returns when protein is below 37%, the returns from the value added grid at 33% was 
chosen arbitrarily. Similarly oil values are arbitrarily selected. Since there was no increase in 
premiums above 37% for either grid, they are compared at the 37% protein value. 
The returns from the value-based grid are always higher than the AGP grid when the payments are 
calculated with a compensation for the yield drag. This compensation leaves the grower with the 
same returns per acre as with the commodity price. It gives the processor a return a· . 
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Table 19: Returns from the AGP and the value based grid in $/bu 
Oil 19.4 19.6 20 20.1 20.3 20.6 20.9 
Protein 
Below 5.07 5.09 5. 10 5.1 1 5.12 5.13 5.14 
37%(AGP) 
Value based 5.21 5.23 5.28 5.29 5.32 5.35 5.39 
33% 
37% and 5.1 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5. 16 5.17 
above(AGP) 
Value based 5.36 5.37 5.38 5.39 5.40 5.41 5.43 
37% and 
above 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study examines component pricing in soybeans through a contract design perspective. It 
is shown through this approach, how a system of component prices can be designed and implemented 
to grow soybeans with higher protein and oil content. Preliminary examination of data and existing 
literature showed that there is considerable variability in the production of components both within 
and between regions and years. This makes it necessary to account for this variability in the contract 
design problem. This also brings in risk in the production of components into the problem. The 
optimal contract was designed using a Principal Agent model with a risk neutral processor and a risk 
neutral grower. In such a contract, the grower faces all the risk from the production of components. 
The contract returns full marginal value of protein and oil to the grower, less a constant. This constant 
is the processor's return from the contract. The EPV is used as a measure of marginal value of 
soybeans. Development of the contract under the assumption of risk aversion of the grower is left to 
future research. 
The significant feature in the empirical development of the contract is the estimation of the 
bivariate distribution of protein and oil. All the data used are from the Iowa Soybean Yield trials for 
the period 1998-2000. Simple linear regressions are run one with protein and the other with oil as the 
dependent variable on indicator variables that identified the region and year. The values of the 
dependent variable are conditioned on assumed actions taken by the grower. Several of the region and 
year indicators turned out to be significant showing that year and region variables are significant in 
explaining variability in the production of components. Residuals from these regressions are used to 
estimate the bivariate distribution of protein and oil conditional on actions taken by the grower. These 
bivariate distributions for protein and oil are estimated using non-parametric methods. The significant 
coefficients for the region and year indicators are added back to the estimated distribution of protein 
and oil to yield the distribution corresponding to each region and year. The bivariate distribution of 
protein and oil are used to estimate the expected value from processing in a given region and year 
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conditional on actions taken by the grower. This makes it possible to develop a different component 
pricing scheme for each region and year. This is how variability in the production of components is 
taken into account in the contract design problem. The marginal distributions of protein and oil show 
the improvement in the distribution of protein and oil that can be brought about through a contract. 
The estimated distributions for each region and year are used to estimate the expected 
increase in social surplus from contracting. This value was estimated to be $0.15 per bushel which 
translated into a per acre value $8.02 when a yield drag due to production of soybeans with higher 
components is taken into account. The expected social surplus from contracting varied considerably 
across years and regions. It can be concluded that there are substantial gains to be made from 
contracting through improvements in the distribution of protein and oil. Currently there are no 
premiums for producing soy meal that exceeds the 48% meal requirement. This puts a. limitation on 
the premiums for higher protein in soybeans. Therefore, the premiums for protein are constant above 
37% protein. Unless processors can capture this value from the feed industry downstream, they will 
not be able to give higher premiums to the growers for their components. 
All the data used in the analysis are from the Iowa Soybean Variety trials. Trial data are 
characterized by very small plots and superior crop management. It would be useful to compare it 
with the actual quality of yield and components that goes into the processors. Information on grower 
response with and without quality incentives will make it possible to estimate accurately the increase 
in social surplus or the improvement in quality from such incentives. 
The biggest limitation is that the contract designed here only takes into account payments per 
bushel and payments made for contracting per acre could not be designed. Estimation of a 
multivariate distribution of yield and components will help estimate accurately the surplus from 
contracting and design a contract with payments per acre. Such a contract will help adjust for the fall 
in returns to the grower as a result of the reduced yi.eld not being overcome by the incentives for 
components. One of the implementation issues in the design and implementation of a contract is the 
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lack of adequate information on soybean variety. Isolating varieties with higher yield and components 
and studying their variability across regjons and years would help estimating the distributions of their 
yields and components, thereby enabling a more accurate estimation of the gains from contracting. 
Identifying varieties useful for contracting would aid implementation of the contract. 
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